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Establishing a Substantial Limitation in 
Interacting with Others: A Call for Clearer 
Guidance from the EEOC 
Lisa M. Benrud-Larson∗ 
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA)1 with the laudable goal of ending discrimination 
against persons with disabilities.2 Congress, however, did not 
intend to protect everyone with a physical or mental impair-
ment—only those with significant impairments. A person is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA only if he or she has a 
physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits” a 
“major life activit[y].”3 This definition may have seemed clear to 
the ADA’s drafters, but it has proven far from clear for litigants 
and the courts.4 Many argue that courts’ interpretation of “dis-
ability” under the ADA has frustrated Congress’s intent “to 
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”5 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D. 
(Clinical Psychology) 1997, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; B.A. 1991, Lu-
ther College. The author wishes to thank Professor Stephen Befort, Alyson 
Tomme, and David Leishman for their helpful guidance. Copyright © 2006 by 
Lisa M. Benrud-Larson. 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
 3. Id. § 12102(2). 
 4. See Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1147; 
Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disabil-
ity: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 243, 244, 251–52 (2002). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2); see also Rothstein et al., supra note 4, at 297 
(noting that the underlying purpose of the ADA has been “undermined by the 
failure to create a reasonably clear definition of the crucial term ‘individual 
with a disability,’ which delineates the class of individuals protected by the 
ADA”). See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal 
Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About 
It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139–60 (2000). 
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Persons with psychiatric disorders face a particularly high 
hurdle when attempting to establish a disability under the 
ADA.6 For example, although courts generally agree that ac-
tivities affected by physical limitations (e.g., walking, seeing, 
lifting) constitute “major life activities” under the ADA, they of-
ten disagree over whether activities primarily affected by men-
tal impairments (e.g., interpersonal interaction, concentration) 
also meet that definition.7 
The current circuit split on how to treat the activity of “in-
teracting with others” highlights this issue. Courts disagree on 
two fundamental issues: first, whether interacting with others 
should constitute a “major life activity” under the ADA; and 
second, what constitutes a “substantial limitation” in interact-
ing with others if it is recognized as a major life activity.8 The 
disconnect among the courts leaves both employers and em-
ployees unsure of how to proceed when facing this difficult is-
sue in the workplace. Employers may forego appropriate disci-
plinary action for fear of being accused of discrimination. 
Employees may forego filing a valid discrimination claim for 
fear that it will be readily dismissed by the court. Confusion 
among the courts underscores the need for more concrete guid-
ance for interpreting the ADA’s definition of disability. Such 
guidance would provide needed clarity to an area of the law 
currently marked by contention and confusion. 
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the 
ADA’s definition of disability, focusing on three key terms: 
mental impairment, major life activity, and substantial limita-
tion. Part II outlines the current circuit split regarding first, 
whether interacting with others is a “major life activity” under 
 
 6. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1168, 1175; Mark DeLoach, Note, Can’t 
We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with Others” as a Major 
Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 
1315 (2004). 
 7. SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 75 (2002). 
 8. Compare Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202–03 (2d Cir. 
2004) (determining that interacting with others constitutes a major life activ-
ity and that a plaintiff is substantially limited when an impairment signifi-
cantly limits his or her fundamental ability to communicate), and McAlindin 
v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234–36 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
interacting with others is a major life activity and that a plaintiff is substan-
tially limited when his or her interaction is characterized by severe problems 
such as consistently high levels of hostility), with Soileau v. Guilford of Me., 
Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the ability to get along 
with others does not constitute a major life activity).  
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the ADA; and second, if so, what constitutes a “substantial 
limitation” in this activity. Part III focuses on courts’ varying 
interpretations of “substantial limitation” in claims brought by 
persons with psychiatric disorders who allege a substantial 
limitation in interacting with others. Part IV proposes recom-
mended guidelines for determining when a plaintiff ’s psychiat-
ric disorder substantially limits his or her ability to interact 
with others, thus qualifying as a disability under the ADA. This 
Note ultimately calls for the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to develop regulations establishing a pre-
sumption of disability based on recognized diagnostic criteria 
and documented medical evidence. 
I.  THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 
Congress enacted the ADA with the stated purpose of 
“provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities.”9 Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimina-
tion in the workplace “against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability.”10 A person is disabled for the 
purposes of the ADA if he or she has “a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; . . . a record of such an impair-
ment; or [is] regarded as having such an impairment.”11 
Under the ADA’s definition of disability, courts must 
engage in a three-step analysis to determine whether a person 
with a psychiatric disorder is disabled: (1) the person must 
have a mental impairment; (2) the mental impairment must 
limit one or more major life activities; and (3) the limitation re-
sulting from the mental impairment must be substantial.12 A 
court determining that a plaintiff is not disabled according to 
this definition dismisses the discrimination suit, foreclosing the 
opportunity to decide the case on its merits. Unfortunately, 
Congress failed to define any of the three key terms in an ADA 
disability analysis: mental impairment, major life activity, and 
substantial limitation. It did, however, authorize the EEOC to 
promulgate regulations to implement Title I of the ADA.13 The 
 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
 10. Id. § 12112(a). 
 11. Id. § 12102(2). 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. § 12116; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1–.16 (2004). 
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EEOC also has issued multiple enforcement guidelines to aid in 
the interpretation of the Act.14 
A. MENTAL IMPAIRMENT 
In its regulations, the EEOC defines “mental impairment” 
as “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental re-
tardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 
and specific learning disabilities.”15 It expands on this list in its 
enforcement guidelines, noting that “emotional or mental ill-
ness” includes such psychiatric disorders as “major depression, 
bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders . . . schizophrenia, and per-
sonality disorders.”16 The EEOC notes that the fourth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV)17 is relevant for the purposes of identifying mental 
disorders.18 EEOC guidelines also specify that “traits or behav-
iors” (e.g., irritability, chronic lateness) “are not, in themselves, 
mental impairments, although they may be linked to mental 
impairments.”19 
Mental impairment is the least debated of the ADA’s three 
key terms. In most cases, courts find (or defendants concede) 
that diagnosed psychiatric disorders, such as bipolar disorder 
and major depressive disorder, constitute a “mental impair-
ment.”20 In contrast, “major life activity” and “substantial limi-
 
 14. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL § 902: DEFINITION OF THE TERM DISABILITY (2000), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html [hereinafter EEOC DEFINITION OF 
DISABILITY]; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NOTICE NO. 
915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/psych.html [hereinafter EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES]. 
 15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). 
 16. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
 17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994). 
 18. See EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 3. The 
EEOC expressly noted, however, that not every condition listed in the DSM-IV 
constitutes a disability or even a mental impairment under the ADA. Id. 
 19. Id. at 4. For example, if an individual’s short temper, arrogance, and 
impatience stem from bipolar disorder, she or he has a mental impairment 
(i.e., bipolar disorder), but such personality traits in and of themselves do not 
constitute impairments under the ADA. See id. 
 20. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a plaintiff ’s bipolar disorder is a mental impairment under the 
ADA); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that a plaintiff ’s anxiety disorder constitutes a mental impair-
ment under the ADA); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 
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tation” have generated much litigation. 
B. MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY 
The EEOC defines major life activities by example, noting 
that they include “functions such as caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working.”21 In the appendix to its regula-
tions, the EEOC further notes that major life activities 
generally include “those basic activities that the average person 
in the general population can perform with little or no diffi-
culty.”22 Recognizing that the examples listed in its regulations 
focus primarily on physical activities, the EEOC specified in its 
Compliance Manual that “[m]ental and emotional processes 
such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others” 
constitute additional examples of major life activities.23 Con-
tinued confusion regarding the definition of major life activity 
in the context of mental illness24 led the EEOC to further clar-
ify its position in its 1997 publication, EEOC Enforcement 
Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiat-
ric Disabilities.25 Here, the EEOC reiterates that mental proc-
esses, including “interacting with others,” constitute major life 
activities under the ADA.26 
Unfortunately, the EEOC’s guidance on the definition of 
major life activity has not led to uniform interpretation of the 
term. This is because courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have questioned the deference due the EEOC’s regulations and 
enforcement guidelines.27 The Court’s decision in Sutton v. 
 
1997) (concluding that a plaintiff ’s dysthymia is a mental impairment within 
the meaning of the ADA). 
 21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004). 
 22. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i). 
 23. EEOC DEFINITION OF DISABILITY, supra note 14, § 902.3(b). 
 24. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1147. 
 25. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14. 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (noting that re-
sponsibility for implementing the ADA is not delegated to a single agency but 
declining to address the issue of deference); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 
105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual 
is “hardly binding” on courts); Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 
2005) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual recognizes “interacting with 
others” as a major life activity under the ADA but that “its persuasive value 
remains undetermined”); see also John N. Ohlweiler, Disability and the Major 
Life Activity of Work: An Un-“Work”-Able Definition, 60 BUS. LAW. 577, 592 
n.76 (2005). 
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United Air Lines, Inc. provides a vivid example.28 In Sutton, the 
Court held that a physical or mental impairment corrected by 
mitigating measures (e.g., medication, corrective lenses) does 
not substantially limit a major life activity and thus does not 
constitute a disability under the ADA.29 In so holding, the 
Court flatly rejected the EEOC’s position on the issue of miti-
gating measures and disability—the EEOC regulations ex-
pressly directed courts to determine a person’s disability status 
based on his or her functioning in an unmitigated state.30 
The Supreme Court provided its own guidance on the defi-
nition of major life activity in Bragdon v. Abbott.31 The case in-
volved a plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV infection who filed an 
ADA claim after a dentist refused to treat her in his office.32 
She asserted that HIV constituted a disability under the ADA 
because it substantially limited her ability to engage in the ma-
jor life activity of reproduction.33 In analyzing what constitutes 
a major life activity, the majority concluded that the plain 
meaning of the word “major” denotes “comparative importance” 
or “significance.”34 In light of this, the Court held that repro-
duction constitutes a major life activity because “[r]eproduction 
and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life 
process itself.”35 The majority rejected the dissent’s opinion 
that major life activities should only include activities that oc-
cur frequently and continuously.36  
 
 28. 527 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1999). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id.; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (2004). 
 31. 524 U.S. at 638. 
 32. Id. at 628–30. 
 33. Id. at 637. 
 34. Id. at 638 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939–40 (1st Cir. 
1997)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 659–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist acknowledged that decisions regarding reproduction are of central 
importance to a person’s life but stressed that such importance is not the de-
fining characteristic of the illustrative major life activities in the EEOC regu-
lations and interpretive guidelines. Id. Instead, the “common thread” among 
the EEOC’s illustrative examples is that “activities are repetitively performed 
and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual.” 
Id. at 660. Justice O’Connor offered a similar rationale, stressing that repro-
duction is not a major life activity because, although important to the lives of 
many women, it “is not generally the same as the representative major life ac-
tivities of all persons—‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working’—listed in 
regulations relevant to the [ADA].” Id. at 664–65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
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The notion that a major life activity must have a daily or 
repetitive component appeared in the Court’s later decision in 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.37 
In Toyota, the Supreme Court reconsidered whether a ma-
jor life activity must occur on a regular or daily basis.38 The 
Toyota Court endorsed the Bragdon Court’s interpretation of 
“major” as denoting importance but added a regularity compo-
nent to the definition in holding that major life activities are 
those that “are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives.”39 After Toyota, major life activities clearly must have a 
daily character.40 The Toyota court also emphasized that the 
ADA must “be interpreted strictly to create a demanding stan-
dard for qualifying as disabled.”41 It reasoned that interpreting 
major life activity liberally would result in significantly more 
disabled individuals than the forty-three million identified by 
Congress as having physical or mental disabilities.42 This, in 
fact, is a common theme in the case law arising under the 
ADA—courts emphasize the need to construe the ADA strictly 
so as “to cover only ‘true’ disabilities.”43 
C. SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION 
The EEOC regulations provide two alternative definitions 
of “substantial limitation”: (1) “[u]nable to perform a major life 
activity that the average person in the general population can 
perform;” or (2) “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, 
manner or duration under which an individual can perform a 
 
(quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)); see 
also Ohlweiler, supra note 27, at 594–96 (discussing the varied definitions of 
“major life activity” articulated in Bragdon’s majority and dissenting opin-
ions). 
 37. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
 40. See Ohlweiler, supra note 27, at 606 (noting that after Toyota, it is 
clear that “a ‘major’ life activity must be a ‘basic’ life activity: one that is es-
sential to the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual”). 
 41. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197. 
 42. Id. at 197–98. 
 43. Hensel, supra note 4, at 1152; see also, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk County 
Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1998) (highlighting the importance of 
ensuring that only individuals with significant disabilities are protected under 
the ADA); Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 152 
(2d Cir. 1998) (noting that “[n]arrowing and diluting the definition of major 
life activity” would undercut the ADA’s protection of only those individuals 
with substantial disabilities). 
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particular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same major life activity.”44 
The EEOC directs courts to consider three factors: (1) the “na-
ture and severity of the impairment;” (2) its “duration or ex-
pected duration;” and (3) its “permanent or long term impact.”45 
With respect to duration, the EEOC’s enforcement guidelines 
specify that an impairment is “substantially limiting if it lasts 
for more than several months and significantly restricts the 
performance of one or more major life activities.”46 The guide-
lines describe a person with major depressive disorder of one 
year’s duration that is characterized by symptoms of intense 
sadness, social withdrawal (other than going to work), insom-
nia, and severe problems with concentration.47 This person has 
a mental impairment (major depressive disorder) that affects 
his ability to interact with others, sleep, and concentrate (three 
major life activities).48 The impairment’s effects are sufficiently 
severe and of long enough duration to qualify as substantially 
limiting.49 
With respect to the major life activity of interacting with 
others, the EEOC guidelines specify that a person is substan-
tially limited “if his/her relations with others [a]re character-
ized on a regular basis by severe problems, for example, consis-
tently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to 
communicate when necessary.”50 For example, a person diag-
nosed with schizophrenia who stays in his room for several 
months and usually refuses to talk with family or close friends 
is substantially limited in interacting with others, and there-
fore disabled within the meaning of the ADA.51 
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court clarified that a 
plaintiff need not establish a complete inability to perform a 
major life activity in order to prove a substantial limitation.52 
 
 44. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2004). 
 45. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
 46. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 8. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 10. The guidelines also point out that “[i]nteracting with others 
. . . is not substantially limited just because an individual is irritable or has 
some trouble getting along with a supervisor or coworker.” Id. at 5 n.15. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
 52. 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (“The Act addresses substantial limitations 
on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”). 
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Instead, one satisfies the definition “[w]hen significant limita-
tions result from the impairment . . . even if the difficulties are 
not insurmountable.”53 The plaintiff still must demonstrate a 
“substantial” or “considerable” limitation.54 Impairments hav-
ing only a minor effect on a major life activity will not qualify 
as a disability under the ADA.55 In Toyota Motor Manufactur-
ing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court further clarified that 
the substantial impairment analysis must not be limited to the 
workplace; courts are to consider the effect of the plaintiff ’s im-
pairment both within and outside the work environment.56 The 
Court added in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. that courts 
must determine a plaintiff ’s disability status in light of all 
mitigating measures, including medication.57 
Many argue that courts’ interpretation of key terms under 
the ADA has failed to provide the “clear, strong, consistent, en-
forceable standards” that Congress intended.58 Employers and 
employees alike have spent much time and money fighting over 
what constitutes a disability under the ADA. The problem 
stems, in part, from the varying deference courts have afforded 
the EEOC’s regulations and interpretive guidelines.59 As noted 
above, the Supreme Court has questioned the EEOC’s author-
ity to issue regulations interpreting the meaning of “disability” 
under the ADA but has declined to address the issue directly.60 
In Toyota, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the 
EEOC regulations were reasonable but failed to address what 
deference, if any, was due.61 Currently, the federal circuits dis-
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 197. 
 56. Id. at 201. 
 57. 527 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1999). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000). See generally Feldblum, supra note 5, 
at 139–60 (reviewing judicial interpretations of the ADA’s definition of disabil-
ity).  
 59. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1997) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual is “hardly binding”); Bell v. 
Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that the EEOC Com-
pliance Manual recognizes “interacting with others” as a major life activity 
under the ADA, but that “its persuasive value remains undetermined”). 
 60. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (“[N]o agency has been delegated authority to 
interpret the term ‘disability.’ . . . The EEOC has, nonetheless, issued regula-
tions to provide additional guidance regarding the proper interpretation of this 
term.”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (noting that responsibility 
for implementing the ADA is not delegated to a single agency but declining to 
address the issue of deference). 
 61. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194. 
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agree over several issues on which the EEOC has spoken, in-
cluding whether interacting with others constitutes a “major 
life activity” and, if so, how to determine whether a plaintiff is 
“substantially limited” in this area.62 
II.  THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 
To date, three circuits have considered whether a substan-
tial limitation in interacting with others constitutes a disability 
under the ADA. Each resolved the issue differently. The courts 
disagree on both of the main issues: (1) whether interacting 
with others constitutes a major life activity; and (2) if so, what 
constitutes a substantial limitation in this area. 
A. INTERACTING WITH OTHERS AS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY 
1. The First Circuit 
The First Circuit was the first to address the issue of 
whether interacting with others constitutes a major life activity 
under the ADA. In Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., a plaintiff 
diagnosed with dysthymia, a chronic depressive disorder, al-
leged that he was disabled under the ADA because his mental 
disorder substantially limited his ability to interact with oth-
ers.63 The First Circuit began its analysis by noting that the 
EEOC regulations promulgated under the ADA do not list the 
ability to interact with others as an example of a “major life ac-
tivity.”64 The court did acknowledge in a footnote that the 
EEOC enforcement guidelines list interacting with others as a 
major life activity, but the opinion emphasized that such guide-
lines are not binding on courts.65 It then declined to recognize 
interacting with others as a major life activity, reasoning that 
the “ability to get along with others” is a “remarkably elastic” 
concept, the presence of which may depend on subjective judg-
ment and/or the particular situation.66 The court refused to in-
 
 62. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric 
Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 283 (2000) (noting that some circuit courts have re-
fused to apply the EEOC’s recommended definitions of “major life activity” and 
“substantially limited”). 
 63. See 105 F.3d at 13. 
 64. See id. at 15. 
 65. See id. at 15 n.2. 
 66. Id. at 15 (“Here, Soileau’s alleged inability to interact with others 
came and went and was triggered by vicissitudes of life which are normally 
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flict a legal duty on an employer “based on such an amorphous 
concept.”67 It noted, however, that “a more narrowly defined 
concept going to essential attributes of human communication 
could, in a particular setting, be understood to be a major life 
activity” under the ADA.68 As discussed below, the Second Cir-
cuit later endorsed such a standard in Jacques v. DiMarzio, 
Inc.69 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
Two years following the First Circuit’s decision in Soileau, 
the Ninth Circuit considered the same question in McAlindin v. 
County of San Diego and reached the opposite conclusion.70 The 
plaintiff in McAlindin claimed that his diagnosed anxiety dis-
order substantially limited his ability to interact with others, 
thus constituting a disability under the ADA.71 The Ninth Cir-
cuit looked to the EEOC regulations and interpretive guide-
lines for guidance in defining what constitutes a major life ac-
tivity under the ADA.72 It concluded that “[b]ecause interacting 
with others is an essential, regular function, like walking and 
breathing, it easily falls within the definition of ‘major life ac-
tivity.’”73 The court expressly rejected the First Circuit’s admo-
nition that “getting along with others” is too amorphous a con-
cept to constitute a major life activity under the ADA.74 It 
pointed out that nothing in the statutory text implicated clarity 
as a criterion for defining a major life activity.75 The court fur-
ther noted that the well-recognized major life activity of “caring 
for oneself” is just as vague as “interacting with others.”76 Sev-
eral district courts have followed McAlindin, emphasizing that 
the “substantially limited” prong of the disability analysis can 
adequately address concerns regarding the breadth of “interact-
ing with others” as a major life activity.77 
 
stressful for ordinary people—losing a girlfriend or being criticized by a super-
visor.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 70. See 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 71. See id. at 1230. 
 72. See id. at 1233 & n.6. 
 73. Id. at 1234. 
 74. Id. at 1234–35. 
 75. See id. at 1234. 
 76. Id. at 1235. 
 77. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1167 nn.197–98 (citing several cases fol-
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3. The Second Circuit 
In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., the Second Circuit became 
the most recent appellate court to address this issue.78 It con-
cluded that “interacting with others” constitutes a major life ac-
tivity under the ADA, although “getting along with others” does 
not.79 The plaintiff suffered from bipolar II disorder and a long-
standing history of psychiatric problems.80 After being termi-
nated from her job following multiple confrontations with 
coworkers, the plaintiff filed an ADA claim alleging a substan-
tial limitation in interacting with others.81 The Second Circuit 
began its analysis by distinguishing between the life activities 
of “getting along with others” (considered in Soileau) and “in-
teracting with others” (considered in McAlindin).82 It noted 
that “‘interacting with others’ . . . more objectively describes a 
life activity than does ‘getting along with others,’ which con-
notes proficiency or success” and necessitates a more subjective 
analysis.83 In making this distinction, the Second Circuit 
attempted to reconcile the disagreement between its sister cir-
cuits. It endorsed the First Circuit’s conclusion that “getting 
along with others” is too subjective to be considered a major life 
activity under the ADA84 while concurring with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s position that “interacting with others” is “‘an essential, 
regular function’ that ‘easily falls within’” the ADA’s definition 
of major life activity.85 The Second Circuit then went on to re-
ject the Ninth Circuit’s standard for determining when one is 
“substantially limited” in interacting with others.86 
 
lowing McAlindin). 
 78. 386 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 79. See id. at 202. 
 80. See id. at 195. 
 81. See id. at 197–98. 
 82. See id. at 202. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. (“We agree with the First Circuit’s observation that ‘get[ting] 
along with others’ is an unworkably subjective definition of a ‘major life activ-
ity’ under the ADA—in much the same way that ‘perceiving’ (as distinct from 
merely ‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’) would be an unworkably subjective ‘major life ac-
tivity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 
F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
 85. Id. (quoting McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 
(9th Cir. 1999)). 
 86. See id. at 202–03. 
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4. Other Courts 
Although other circuits have confronted the issue of 
whether interacting with others constitutes a major life activity 
under the ADA, they all avoided addressing it directly.87 Sev-
eral have done this by skipping to the “substantially limited” 
prong of the analysis.88 By finding that the plaintiff is not sub-
stantially limited in interacting with others, a court can hold 
that he or she is not protected under the ADA without having 
to decide if interacting with others constitutes a major life ac-
tivity. The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue. 
B. STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING A SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION 
IN INTERACTING WITH OTHERS 
Once a court holds that interacting with others is a major 
life activity, it must determine what constitutes a “substantial 
limitation” in this activity. The Ninth and Second Circuits ad-
dressed this issue in McAlindin and Jacques, respectively. 
They disagreed on the answer. 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
After concluding in McAlindin that interacting with others 
constitutes a major life activity, the Ninth Circuit looked to the 
EEOC’s interpretive guidelines to determine what constitutes a 
substantial limitation in this area. It adopted the EEOC’s rec-
ommendation that a plaintiff attempting to establish a sub-
stantial limitation in interacting with others “must show that 
his ‘relations with others [a]re characterized on a regular basis 
by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hos-
tility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when neces-
sary.’”89 The court stressed that the limitation “must be severe” 
and that mere cantankerousness or “trouble getting along with 
coworkers” does not constitute a substantial limitation in this 
area.90 The court focused on documented medical evidence per-
taining to the plaintiff ’s symptoms when concluding that the 
 
 87. See id. at 202 n.8 for a summary of circuits declining to address 
whether interacting with others constitutes a major life activity under the 
ADA. 
 88. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 274 
(4th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir. 
2003); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 89. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235 (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC 
ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, ¶ 9, at 10). 
 90. Id. 
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evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of fact regarding 
whether the plaintiff ’s anxiety disorder resulted in a substan-
tial limitation in interacting with others.91 
2. The Second Circuit 
To date, the Second Circuit sets the highest bar for a plain-
tiff attempting to prove a substantial limitation in interacting 
with others. In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., the court did not 
mince words when it condemned the Ninth Circuit’s test as 
“unworkable, unbounded, and useless as guidance to employ-
ers, employees, judges, and juries.”92 It proclaimed the Ninth 
Circuit’s demarcation between hostility and mere cantanker-
ousness “illusory”93 and asserted that its test “frustrates the 
maintenance of a civil workplace environment.”94 The court 
opined that a standard requiring “consistently high levels of 
hostility” would simply result in more protection under the 
ADA for the most “troublesome and nasty . . . employee.”95 
In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s (and the EEOC’s) approach, 
the Second Circuit announced a new standard for determining 
whether a person is substantially limited in interacting with 
others. One meets this standard “when the mental or physical 
impairment severely limits the fundamental ability to commu-
nicate with others.”96 The court made it clear that only those 
with the most basic, severe limitations in communication would 
qualify under this test, but it noted that a number of severe 
psychiatric disorders may result in such impairment.97 The 
court elaborated: 
This standard is satisfied when the impairment severely limits the 
plaintiff ’s ability to connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with 
other people and respond to them, or to go among other people—at 
the most basic level of these activities. The standard is not satisfied 
by a plaintiff whose basic ability to communicate with others is not 
substantially limited but whose communication is inappropriate, inef-
fective, or unsuccessful. A plaintiff who otherwise can perform the 
functions of a job with (or without) reasonable accommodation could 
 
 91. See id. at 1235–36 (noting that several evaluating physicians docu-
mented the plaintiff ’s pattern of withdrawal caused by his anxiety disorder). 
 92. 386 F.3d at 202. 
 93. In making its point, the Second Circuit pointed out the similarities in 
the dictionary definitions of “hostile” and “cantankerous.” Id. at 203. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 203–04. 
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satisfy this standard by demonstrating isolation resulting from any of 
a number of severe conditions, including acute or profound cases of: 
autism, agoraphobia, depression or other conditions that we need not 
try to anticipate today.98 
By requiring a significant limitation in the fundamental 
ability to communicate, the Second Circuit appears to have set 
a tougher standard for plaintiffs than either the Ninth Circuit99 
or the EEOC.100 
3. Other Courts 
Several other circuits have considered whether a plaintiff 
with a psychiatric disorder is substantially impaired in inter-
acting with others, but none has outlined a specific standard for 
deciding the issue.101 To date, the Supreme Court has declined 
to address the issue.102 Consequently, both employers and em-
ployees face uncertainty when confronting this unresolved area 
of the law. 
III.  COURTS’ UNEVEN TREATMENT OF 
INTERACTING-WITH-OTHERS CLAIMS 
Interacting-with-others claims have received decidedly un-
even treatment by the courts. Although unpredictability char-
acterizes both the major life activity and substantial limitation 
prongs of the analysis, the variance in the latter is particularly 
noteworthy. 
A. INTERACTING WITH OTHERS AS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY 
In enacting the ADA, Congress consciously chose to protect 
individuals with both mental and physical impairments.103 The 
Act, however, has fallen short in its attempt to protect persons 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 100. See EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, ¶ 9, at 10.  
 101. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 274 
(4th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 102. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 530 U.S. 1243 (2000), de-
nying cert. to 192 F.3d 1226.  
 103. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (“The term ‘disability’ means . . . a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major 
life activities.” (emphasis added)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2004) (list-
ing “emotional or mental illness” as an impairment under the ADA). 
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with mental impairments.104 For example, courts more often 
hold that interacting with others is a major life activity when a 
person with a physical impairment (e.g., diabetes, AIDS), 
rather than a mental impairment, brings the claim.105 This 
seems somewhat counterintuitive. Diabetes, for example, is not 
likely to impair one’s interaction with others to the extent that 
a mental illness such as bipolar I disorder would. A person 
must demonstrate “marked” impairment in social or occupa-
tional functioning before even receiving a diagnosis of bipolar I 
disorder.107 This tendency may reflect the discomfort that 
many, including judges, have with mental illness.108 As Profes-
sor Nancy Hensel has noted, “Judges, and indeed employers, 
are likely concerned that if they recognize interacting with oth-
ers in the context of mental disability, they will be validating 
frivolous claims brought by ‘otherwise normal’ employees who 
are simply ‘difficult’ and manipulating the ADA to secure pref-
erable and unwarranted concessions.”109 This is a valid concern: 
courts must craft a standard narrow enough to block frivolous 
claims yet broad enough to allow legitimate claims to proceed. 
Although courts continue to disagree about whether inter-
acting with others should constitute a major life activity,110 the 
recent trend is toward recognizing it as such.111 Doing so corre-
sponds with both the EEOC’s and the Supreme Court’s guid-
ance on the ADA’s definition of “major life activity.” The EEOC 
expressly lists interacting with others as a major life activity in 
its interpretive guidelines.112 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that a ma-
 
 104. See Douglas A. Blair, Employees Suffering from Bipolar Disorder or 
Clinical Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection Under Title I of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347, 1358 (1999); 
Hensel, supra note 4, at 1139–42. 
 105. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1168. 
 107. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17, at 355–58. 
 108. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1168–70. 
 109. Id. at 1169–70. 
 110. Compare Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 
1997) (declining to recognize interacting with others as a major life activity 
under the ADA), with Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 
2004), and McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 
1999) (both recognizing interacting with others as a major life activity under 
the ADA). 
 111. See, e.g., DiMarzio, 386 F.3d at 202; McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234. 
 112. See EEOC DEFINITION OF DISABILITY, supra note 14, § 902.3(b); 
EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, ¶ 3, at 5. 
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jor life activity is one that is “of central importance to daily 
life.”113 Undoubtedly, interacting with others constitutes a sig-
nificant and regular aspect of most people’s daily lives.114 Simi-
lar to walking, breathing, and caring for oneself (other com-
monly recognized major life activities under the ADA), most 
people must interact with others multiple times throughout the 
day. It is thus “essential in the day-to-day existence of a nor-
mally functioning individual.”115 Consequently, courts should 
follow the Ninth and Second Circuits’ lead in recognizing inter-
acting with others as a major life activity under the ADA. 
Uniform recognition of interacting with others as a major 
life activity would lower one roadblock for persons with mental 
illness attempting to establish a disability in this area. How-
ever, the “substantial limitation” prong creates an even larger 
hurdle for plaintiffs.116 
B. ESTABLISHING A SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION IN INTERACTING 
WITH OTHERS 
Litigants face particular difficulty when trying to predict a 
court’s analysis of what constitutes a substantial limitation in 
interacting with others. Courts vary in their treatment of sev-
eral issues, including the degree of limitation required across 
different spheres of life (e.g., work versus home), the temporal 
requirements of the limitation, and the weight accorded to ex-
pert medical testimony regarding the limitation. 
1. Substantial Limitation Versus Complete Inability 
Commentators posit that courts employ “excessively exact-
ing standards” in determining whether a plaintiff is substan-
 
 113. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
 114. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1189–90, for an excellent discussion of 
why interacting with others should be uniformly recognized as a major life ac-
tivity under the ADA. Hensel notes that “[i]nteracting with others, by any 
definition, is a required precursor to an individual’s ability to work, to love, to 
reproduce and to function on a day-to-day basis in modern society.” Id. at 
1189.  
 115. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 660 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. See Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation That Drives Us Crazy: 
An Overview of “Mental Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
31 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 94 (2000) (“[A]lthough the courts are somewhat split on 
how broadly they should interpret ‘major life activity,’ this term does not seem 
to be the major stumbling block for employees in proving disability. . . . [T]he 
test for ‘substantial limitation’ appears to play a major ‘gatekeeping’ role in 
limiting claims.”). 
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tially limited in interacting with others.117 Despite the Su-
preme Court’s instruction in Bragdon that “substantially lim-
ited” does not require a “complete inability” to perform a major 
life activity,118 courts often have required virtual incapacity in 
interpersonal relations in order for a plaintiff to prevail in an 
interacting-with-others claim.119 Evidence of any ability to in-
teract with others in either one’s private or work life likely will 
defeat a plaintiff ’s disability claim at the summary judgment 
stage.120 For example, in Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, the 
plaintiff suffered from a twenty-year history of severe depres-
sion marked by multiple hospitalizations and ongoing outpa-
tient treatment, including electroconvulsive therapy.121 Despite 
the plaintiff ’s testimony that her depression caused great sad-
ness, isolation, and a failure to talk to anyone, the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that she was not substantially impaired in in-
teracting with others.122 The court apparently based its 
conclusion largely on the fact that the plaintiff ’s depression did 
not prohibit her from performing her job, which involved su-
pervising other employees.123 
Similarly, in Steele v. Thiokol Corp., the Tenth Circuit held 
that a plaintiff suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD) was not substantially limited in interacting with others 
despite evidence of repeated problems with multiple coworkers 
and supervisors that ultimately resulted in a “nervous break-
down” and a three-and-a-half week leave of absence.124 The 
court emphasized that, unlike the plaintiff in McAlindin, Mr. 
Steele failed to provide evidence that his OCD caused substan-
tial impairment in getting along with people in general.125 In-
stead, he only provided evidence of difficulties getting along 
 
 117.  Hensel, supra note 4, at 1178 (“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘sub-
stantially limited’ requirement to be so exacting in connection with interacting 
with others that few plaintiffs have been able to survive summary judg-
ment.”); see also DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1338 (“Essentially, the . . . court 
equated substantial limitation with total inability to interact with others.”). 
 118. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
 119. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1181; see also Heisler v. Metro. Council, 
339 F.3d 622, 625, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2003); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 
1248, 1250–52, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (both holding that the plaintiff did not 
produce sufficient evidence to prevail on an interacting with others claim). 
 120. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194. 
 121. See 339 F.3d at 625. 
 122. See id. at 628–29. 
 123. See id. at 629. 
 124. 241 F.3d at 1250–52. 
 125. See id. at 1255. 
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with people at work, which was not enough to survive summary 
judgment.126 
While some courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate a 
nearly complete inability to interact with others across all 
spheres of life, others allow a case to proceed on much weaker 
evidence of a substantial limitation. In Bennett v. Unisys Corp., 
a plaintiff with major depressive disorder survived summary 
judgment based on her and her coworkers’ testimony that she 
was “belligerent,” had “difficulty controlling her emotions,” and 
possessed deficient interpersonal skills at work.127 The court 
purportedly applied the McAlindin/EEOC standard and noted 
that one does not have to show a complete inability to interact 
with others or daily problems to establish a substantial limita-
tion in interacting with others.128 In Lemire v. Silva, the plain-
tiff had a longstanding history of panic disorder with agorapho-
bia.129 The plaintiff ’s treating psychiatrist testified that 
although her ability to relate to her family continued to have a 
good prognosis, she was impaired in her ability to interact with 
others in crowded places.130 Based on this evidence, the court, 
applying the McAlindin standard, concluded that a genuine is-
sue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff ’s inabil-
ity to interact with others in crowded places constituted a sub-
stantial limitation in interacting with others.131 Clearly, courts 
ostensibly applying the same standard come up with very dif-
ferent results. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams suggests that courts are cor-
rect to require evidence of impairment in interacting with oth-
ers across multiple spheres of life.132 The Court’s decision in 
Bragdon v. Abbott, however, established that a disability under 
the ADA does not require proof of a complete inability to per-
form a major life activity.134 An impairment may substantially 
 
 126. See id.; see also Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 
1131 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Steele in holding that the plaintiff ’s severe inter-
personal problems with multiple coworkers did not establish a general inabil-
ity to get along with others). 
 127. No. 2:99 CV0446, 2000 WL 33126583, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000). 
 128. See id. at *5. 
 129. See 104 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 130. See id. at 88. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See 534 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2002). 
 134. See 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). 
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limit a major life activity even if the resulting difficulties are 
not “insurmountable” in all areas of a person’s life.135 The fact 
that an individual attempts to participate in a major life activ-
ity despite an impairment should not automatically signal that 
he or she is not substantially limited in that activity.136 
2. Substantial Limitation and Chronic Intermittent Disorders 
Commentators also criticize courts’ analyses of duration of 
psychiatric disabilities when evaluating whether a plaintiff is 
substantially limited in interacting with others.137 Courts often 
minimize the disabling impact of chronic conditions by rejecting 
claims of psychiatric disability that are not supported by medi-
cal evidence of recurrent and ongoing problems.138 Thus, a per-
son with a severe but intermittent chronic disorder likely faces 
an uphill battle in establishing a disability based on substan-
tial impairment in interacting with others. 
Courts must not automatically discount psychiatric disor-
ders with an episodic course. One with a severe mental illness 
may experience a disease course marked by periods of relative 
adjustment interspersed with periods of substantially impaired 
functioning. For example, the DSM-IV describes bipolar I dis-
order as a “recurrent disorder” in which the majority of those 
affected “return to a fully functional level between [manic] epi-
sodes.”139 The lack of constant impaired functioning should not, 
in itself, defeat a disability claim. Courts should not downplay 
the severity of a psychiatric disorder just because the plaintiff 
does not experience florid symptoms on a daily basis. Instead, a 
court must distinguish between acute manifestations of a seri-
ous, underlying psychiatric disorder (e.g., bipolar I disorder) 
versus a temporary, nonchronic condition (e.g., adjustment dis-
 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194 (quoting Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance 
Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002)). Hensel elaborates: 
Just as an individual in a wheelchair “may be mobile and capable of 
functioning in society but still be disabled because of a substantial 
limitation on their ability to walk or run,” an individual capable of in-
teracting with others some of the time who nevertheless experiences 
significant difficulty in doing so likewise is substantially limited in 
the ability to interact with others. 
Id. (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999)). 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 1187. 
 138. See id. at 1187–88. 
 139. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17, at 353. 
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order, bereavement).140 The EEOC recognized this when it 
noted in its enforcement guidelines that “[c]hronic, episodic 
conditions may constitute substantially limiting impairments if 
they are substantially limiting when active or have a high like-
lihood of recurrence in substantially limiting forms.”141 
The Third Circuit heeded the EEOC’s guidance regarding 
chronic conditions in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District.142 
The fact that the plaintiff did not experience problems on a 
daily basis due to bipolar disorder did not foreclose the possibil-
ity that she was substantially limited in the major life activity 
of thinking.143 The court noted that “[c]hronic, episodic condi-
tions can easily limit how well a person performs an activity as 
compared to the rest of the population.”144 The substantial limi-
tation inquiry must focus on the nature (e.g., typical course) 
and severity of the impairment rather than the mere number of 
days one experiences limitations.145 A plaintiff suffering from a 
“severe and potentially long-term” condition should survive 
summary judgment and proceed to a presentation of his or her 
case on the merits.146 
Of course, simply counting the number of days a plaintiff 
claims substantial impairment is much easier than analyzing 
whether the severity, duration, and course of a mental impair-
ment cause a substantial limitation in interacting with others. 
 
 140. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1195 (“[I]t is simply inequitable to view 
each episode of disability in isolation, equating flare-ups of serious underlying 
and ongoing impairments with mere temporary and ‘intermittent’ condi-
tions . . . .”); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17, at 626, 684 (de-
scribing adjustment disorder and bereavement). 
 141. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 9. 
 142. 184 F.3d 296, 309 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. The court also noted: 
When we consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its du-
ration, and its expected long-term impact, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2), 
we find evidence that [the plaintiff] has had to contend with a serious, 
very much ongoing condition. . . . That she may not have experienced 
problems every day does not defeat her claim. . . . [R]epeated flare-ups 
of poor health can have a cumulative weight that wears down a per-
son’ resolve and continually breaks apart longer-term projects. 
Id. 
 145. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1195. 
 146. Id. at 1196; see also Zylan, supra note 116, at 95 (asserting that con-
sideration of duration is unnecessary in determining whether a mental im-
pairment substantially limits a major life activity because it might bar valid 
claims of those who suffer “an episodic or seemingly transient emotional dis-
order”). 
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The more comprehensive analysis of the substantial limitation 
requires knowledge of psychiatric disorders, which necessitates 
reliance on psychiatric experts. As such, documented medical 
evidence plays a critical role in substantiating a claim of sub-
stantial impairment in interacting with others. 
3. Reliance on Documented Medical Evidence 
Not surprisingly, courts vary in the extent to which they 
rely on (or perhaps believe) documented medical evidence and 
expert testimony regarding the effect of a plaintiff ’s mental dis-
order on his or her ability to interact with others. The 
McAlindin court relied heavily on documented clinical findings 
from multiple physicians indicating that the plaintiff ’s mental 
illness resulted in a pattern of withdrawal from public places 
and family members.147 The court concluded that the docu-
mented medical evidence “suggest[ed] that McAlindin suf-
fer[ed] from a total inability to communicate at times, in addi-
tion to a more subtle impairment in engaging in meaningful 
discussion” and that his “alleged ‘fear reaction’ and ‘communi-
cative paralysis’ [we]re sufficiently severe to raise a genuine is-
sue of material fact about his ability to interact with others.”148 
In contrast, the court did not place considerable weight on 
documented medical evidence of the plaintiff ’s impairment in 
Zale v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.149 The court determined that the 
plaintiff ’s “chronic and moderately severe”150 post traumatic 
stress disorder—characterized by distressing dreams, feelings 
of detachment from others, irritability, avoidance, hyperalert-
ness, poor anger control, and psychological distress151—did not 
cause a substantial impairment in interacting with others.152 It 
concluded that the plaintiff ’s problems with coworkers reflected 
“a situational response, exacerbated by work harassment but 
lacking facts showing a manifestation of any regular or consis-
tent nature.”153 The court noted that there was little in the re-
 
 147. See McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 148. Id. at 1235–36. 
 149. See No. 3:97CV00125(JBA), 2000 WL 306943, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 
2000). 
 150. Id. at *5. 
 151. See id. at *1, *5. 
 152. See id. at *1, *6 (finding that Zale’s evidence “is insufficient . . . to 
meet the standard set out in McAlindin”).  
 153. Id. at *6. 
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cord to distinguish the plaintiff from the average “‘cantanker-
ous employee’ referenced in McAlindin.”154 
As illustrated by the above discussion, the evidence re-
quired to establish a disability by demonstrating a substantial 
impairment in interacting with others depends primarily on 
the court hearing the case.155 In light of this, several commen-
tators emphasize the need for more detailed guidance on the is-
sue.156 Some posit that the Ninth and Second Circuits provided 
the necessary guidance in McAlindin and DiMarzio, respec-
tively.157 Others are not so sure.158 
C. THE MCALINDIN AND DIMARZIO SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION 
STANDARDS 
Both the Ninth and Second Circuits attempted to clarify 
the definition of “substantially limited” in the context of an “in-
teracting with others claim,” with questionable success. The 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Cf. Feldblum, supra note 5, at 150 (“[T]he varied results in cases un-
der the ADA as to whether an impairment substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity often seem to depend more on the court’s belief in the merits of the 
plaintiff ’s underlying claim than on the specific effects of the plaintiff ’s im-
pairment on his or her life.”). 
 156. See, e.g., DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1341–42 (noting that the lower 
courts need more detailed guidance regarding the meaning of “substantially 
limits” and calling for the EEOC to promulgate regulations providing “a more 
comprehensive statement of what a plaintiff must show to establish a substan-
tial limitation in her ability to interact with others”); see also Rothstein et al., 
supra note 4, at 296–97 (noting that the underlying purpose of the ADA has 
been “undermined by the failure to create a reasonably clear definition of the 
crucial term ‘individual with a disability’”). 
 157. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194 (“The McAlindin standard, 
whereby those demonstrating severe problems on a regular basis, such as 
‘consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal or failure to communi-
cate when necessary,’ strikes a good balance between frivolous and significant 
interacting with others claims.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Lyda Phillips, 
Accommodating the Problem Employee: No Easy Answers, Experts and Courts 
Agree, 73 U.S. L. WK. 2275, 2276 (2004) (“[T]he Second Circuit’s standard for 
determining whether a mental disability is substantially limiting offers ‘far 
more practical guidance.’” (quoting Sharon Rennert, Senior Attorney Advisor, 
ADA Division of EEOC)). 
 158. See, e.g., DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1342 (“While [the McAlindin] 
standard appears to strike a better balance than courts that require almost 
complete inability to interact with others, its language . . . may also be too 
vague, thus allowing lower courts to continue setting too high a burden for the 
substantial limitation requirement.”); see also Stephanie Francis Ward, A 
Split on Personality, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Oct. 15, 2004, available at 3 No. 41 
ABAJEREP 4 (Westlaw) (noting that the Second Circuit’s DiMarzio opinion 
did little to clarify the definition of disability under the ADA). 
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Ninth Circuit’s standard announced in McAlindin—inter-
ersonal interactions characterized by recurrent and severe 
problems, such as “consistently high levels of hostility, social 
withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary”159—
appears to provide concrete guidance. However, courts have 
varied widely in their application of the standard.160 Many have 
made the standard essentially insurmountable by requiring 
“comprehensive evidence of virtual incapacity prior to a finding 
of substantial limitation.”161 
Courts’ application of the Second Circuit’s standard an-
nounced in DiMarzio (one is substantially limited in interacting 
with others when a “mental or physical impairment severely 
limits the fundamental ability to communicate with others”162) 
remains untested. However, given that the DiMarzio standard 
sets the bar higher for plaintiffs than the McAlindin standard, 
courts already requiring a nearly complete inability to interact 
with others likely will interpret the DiMarzio standard as re-
quiring the same. After all, it does not require a stretch of the 
imagination to argue that a limitation in the “fundamental 
ability” to communicate essentially equals a virtual incapacity 
to interact with others. On the other hand, one also could argue 
that a person is limited in the fundamental ability to communi-
cate with others if he or she has recurrent and severe problems 
interacting with others, in other words, the McAlindin stan-
dard.164 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s standard for defining a 
 
 159. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 10). 
 160. Compare Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that if it applied the McAlindin standard the plaintiff would not be 
substantially limited in interacting with others because he did not present 
evidence of impairment outside of work), with Lemire v. Silva, 104 F. Supp. 2d 
80, 88 (D. Mass. 2000) (applying the McAlindin standard and holding that the 
plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she 
was substantially limited in interacting with others due to difficulty interact-
ing with others in crowded places). 
 161. Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194; see, e.g., Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 
F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not meet the 
McAlindin standard because, despite significant depressive symptoms affect-
ing her ability to interact with others, she continued to perform her job, which 
involved supervising other employees). 
 162. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis 
added). 
 164. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235. 
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substantial limitation in interacting with others does little to 
clarify the definition of the term. Employers and employees still 
face a nonuniform and unpredictable standard. Undoubtedly, 
courts will continue to struggle with, and disagree on, just how 
severe a plaintiff ’s limitation in interacting with others must 
be before it qualifies as “substantial.” Congress could address 
this confusion and unpredictability by unambiguously directing 
the EEOC to promulgate, through notice and comment rule-
making,165 concrete guidelines for determining the existence of 
a substantial limitation in interacting with others. The EEOC 
should ground the criteria in established psychiatric diagnoses 
and expert testimony regarding the effect of a plaintiff ’s psy-
chiatric disorder on his or her ability to interact with others. 
Given the complexity of psychiatric diagnoses and the variabil-
ity of their effects on functioning, it makes sense to leave the 
determination of whether a person’s mental impairment sub-
stantially limits his or her ability to interact with others to the 
experts—i.e., the mental health professionals responsible for 
the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The uncertainty surrounding the definition of disability 
under the ADA leaves all parties guessing and frustrates the 
ADA’s goal of providing “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”166 Further, the “virtual incapacity” standard ap-
plied by many courts in interacting-with-others claims does not 
effectuate the intended purpose behind the ADA and often pre-
vents deserving plaintiffs from presenting their case on the 
merits.167 The challenge lies in fashioning a standard that 
 
 165. Notice and comment rulemaking is one method through which execu-
tive agencies promulgate regulations that have the force of law. See 
Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000). 
 167. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 150–51 (citing several cases meri-
torious on their face but ultimately dismissed because the disability was not 
found to “substantially limit” the plaintiff and noting that courts “are perceiv-
ing a spirit of the ADA that was never envisioned by any of us who worked to 
enact the law”); see also Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194 (“[D]eserving plaintiffs 
should be permitted to present their claims before a jury without the need to 
first present evidence of near-total incapacitation.”); Rothstein et al., supra 
note 4, at 249 (“[T]he courts have been so restrictive in interpreting the statu-
tory definition of an individual with a disability that the limited coverage ap-
proach has been extended beyond that intended by Congress.”). 
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strikes an appropriate balance between the concerns of employ-
ers and employees while providing clear guidance to the courts. 
This Note recommends that Congress authorize the EEOC 
to establish, after notice and comment rulemaking, criteria for 
determining when a mental impairment results in a substan-
tial limitation in interacting with others. At a minimum, the 
criteria should require documented medical evidence of a 
preexisting mental impairment in the form of a DSM-IV diag-
nosis made by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist.168 A sub-
stantial limitation in interacting with others (and hence dis-
ability) would be presumed for certain DSM-IV diagnoses, such 
as those for which “marked impairment” in interpersonal func-
tioning is a required characteristic of the disorder. For other 
psychiatric diagnoses, plaintiffs must present documented 
medical evidence regarding the impact of the diagnosed mental 
impairment on his or her ability to interact with others.169 
A. PRESUMPTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION IN 
INTERACTING WITH OTHERS BASED ON DSM-IV DIAGNOSES 
To receive a psychiatric diagnosis, a person typically must 
display some degree of impairment in occupational or social 
functioning.170 For example, a diagnosis of severe major depres-
sive disorder requires that symptoms “markedly interfere with 
occupational functioning or with usual social activities or rela-
tionships with others.”171 The criteria for a manic episode re-
quire that symptoms “cause marked impairment in occupa-
tional functioning or in usual social activities or relationships 
 
 168. Both psychiatrists and clinical psychologists receive specialized train-
ing in the diagnosis of mental disorders. 
 169. See Zylan, supra note 116, at 114 (“Forcing employees to provide 
documented evidence or expert opinion regarding the nexus between the con-
duct and the disorder should be required.”). Rothstein and his colleagues pro-
posed a similar scheme calling for Congress to authorize the EEOC, after no-
tice and comment rulemaking, to publish medical criteria for determining 
when the most common physical and mental impairments are severe enough 
to constitute a disability under the ADA. Rothstein et al., supra note 4, at 244, 
270–72. Disability (and thus ADA coverage) would be presumed for those 
meeting the established criteria; no disability would be presumed for those not 
meeting the criteria. Id. A party could rebut the presumption by demonstrat-
ing, via clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff ’s impairment either 
did or did not substantially limit a major life activity. Id. 
 170. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17 (describing fea-
tures of a wide range of mental disorders). 
 171. Id. at 377–78. 
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with others.”172 A diagnosis of OCD requires that symptoms 
“cause marked distress, are time consuming . . . or significantly 
interfere with the person’s normal routine, occupational (or 
academic) functioning, or usual social activities or relation-
ships.”173 
As illustrated above, many psychiatric diagnoses inher-
ently contain evidence directly relevant to one’s ability to inter-
act with others. A documented DSM-IV diagnosis characterized 
by “marked” or “significant” impairment in social functioning 
(e.g., severe major depressive disorder),174 should establish a 
presumption of substantial impairment in interacting with oth-
ers and, hence, disability under the ADA. In contrast, a plain-
tiff diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder that does not neces-
sarily involve “marked” or “significant” impairment in 
interpersonal functioning (e.g., mild major depressive disor-
der175) would have to provide documented medical evidence re-
garding the effect of the disorder on his or her ability to inter-
act with others. 
B. DOCUMENTED MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF A PSYCHIATRIC 
DISORDER’S EFFECT ON FUNCTIONING 
If significant impairment in interpersonal functioning is 
not an essential criterion of a plaintiff ’s psychiatric diagnosis, 
she or he must establish a substantial limitation in interacting 
with others through documented medical evidence of the disor-
der’s effect on such functioning. The EEOC’s existing enforce-
ment guidelines do not require expert testimony regarding a 
substantial limitation.176 However, doing so would help legiti-
mize these claims in the eyes of both courts and laypersons. It 
certainly should help eliminate some of the error involved in al-
lowing judges untrained in the diagnosis of psychiatric disor-
ders to determine the existence and effect of a mental illness.177 
 
 172. Id. at 332. 
 173. Id. at 423. 
 174. Id. at 377–78. 
 175. Id. at 377 (describing a patient having “only minor impairment in oc-
cupational functions or in unusual social activities or relationships with oth-
ers”). 
 176. See EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 6. 
 177. Of course, trained mental health professionals can, and do, disagree 
regarding the correct psychiatric diagnosis. See Zylan, supra note 116, at 121–
22 (noting that psychiatric expert testimony can complicate litigation by creat-
ing a “battle of the experts”). However, such experts are arguably better at de-
termining the existence and effect of a psychiatric disorder than is the judici-
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A person justifiably limited by a mental impairment likely 
will have preexisting, documented medical evidence to that ef-
fect in the form of a psychiatric or psychological consultation 
and ongoing treatment notes. Therefore, requiring such evi-
dence should not provide an unreasonable hurdle for those with 
legitimate claims. Further, it should help eliminate frivolous 
claims conceived in a post hoc fashion following an adverse em-
ployment decision.178 On the other hand, reliance on expert tes-
timony necessarily opens the door to “expert shopping” and po-
tentially leaves the judge with the difficult task of refereeing a 
“battle of the experts.”179 The Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA)180 provides one model for dealing with this problem. 
Under the FMLA, an employee may take up to twelve 
weeks leave for a “serious health condition.”181 Before authoriz-
ing leave, the employer may require the employee to provide 
medical certification documenting the existence of the health 
condition.182 If the employer questions the adequacy of the 
medical certification provided by the employee, it may require a 
second opinion from a health care professional of its choos-
ing.183 The employer pays for the second evaluation, which may 
not be performed by a health care provider used on a regular 
basis by the employer.184 If the two experts disagree, the em-
ployer may require a third medical opinion.185 Both the em-
ployer and employee must approve the third evaluator,186 
whose conclusions are dispositive.187 
The EEOC could employ similar requirements for psychi-
atric disorders that do not meet the presumption of disability. 
If mental health professionals testifying for the employee and 
the employer disagree as to whether the employee’s mental im-
 
ary. 
 178. See Blair, supra note 104, at 1397–98 (noting that requiring a docu-
mented psychiatric diagnosis would allow courts to dismiss claims where a 
plaintiff “asserts an undiagnosed ailment while employed and then attempts 
medical validation after termination”). 
 179. See Zylan, supra note 116, at 122. 
 180. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000)). 
 181. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(1)(D). 
 182. See id. § 2613(a). 
 183. See id. § 2613(c)(1). 
 184. See id. § 2613(c)(2).  
 185. See id. § 2613(d)(1). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. § 2613(d)(2). 
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pairment causes a substantial limitation in interacting with 
others, the court could require a third opinion. The parties to-
gether would designate the “tiebreaker” expert whose opinion 
would be final and binding. 
C. ADOPTING THE REGULATIONS 
Drafting regulations establishing criteria for a substantial 
impairment in interacting with others is not a simple task. It 
is, however, an achievable one. Mental health professionals al-
ready diagnose psychiatric disorders based on established 
DSM-IV criteria.188 Psychiatric diagnoses typically require 
some degree of impairment in occupational or social function-
ing. Most also include an indication of the severity and course 
of the disorder. Consequently, psychiatrists and clinical psy-
chologists are well equipped to help specify diagnostic criteria 
suitable for establishing a presumption of substantial limita-
tion in interacting with others. Because agencies have access to 
such experts, EEOC rulemaking provides the best approach for 
establishing such standards.189 The inconsistency in courts’ 
deference to existing EEOC regulations and guidelines sug-
gests that Congress may need to amend the ADA to ensure 
compliance with the proposed regulations. A clear congres-
sional statement granting the EEOC authority to implement 
regulations regarding what constitutes a substantial limitation 
in interacting with others likely would result in deference from 
the courts.190 
The current state of the law generates considerable uncer-
tainty regarding what constitutes a disability under the ADA. 
This unpredictability permeates the Act—it is not limited to 
 
 188. See Rothstein et al., supra note 4, at 271 (“Medical practice guidelines 
and standard diagnostic and treatment protocols routinely designate the 
medical criteria for determining when a condition is mild, moderate, or severe. 
These determinations are crucial in the clinical setting to indicate the appro-
priate course of treatment.”). 
 189. See id. (proposing that the EEOC consult with professional medical 
associations and organizations when promulgating rules establishing medical 
standards). 
 190. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding 
that the mandatory deference of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is reserved for agency interpretations 
adopted pursuant to a congressional delegation of rulemaking authority); see 
also DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1342–43 (recommending that the EEOC prom-
ulgate regulations regarding what constitutes a substantial limitation in in-
teracting with others because courts afford greater deference to agency regula-
tions promulgated through formal rulemaking procedures). 
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persons with mental impairments attempting to establish a 
substantial limitation in interacting with others.191 The confu-
sion in the realm of interacting with others, however, is par-
ticularly salient. This likely stems from a number of factors, in-
cluding the invisibility of mental impairments, widespread 
misconceptions and stereotypes regarding their impact on func-
tioning,192 and the lack of “objective” evidence demonstrating a 
causal link between a mental impairment and functional limi-
tations.193 As such, there is a heightened need for detailed regu-
latory guidance establishing what constitutes a substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of interacting with others. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the ADA with the goal of providing clear 
and consistent standards for eliminating discrimination against 
persons with disabilities. This goal has not been realized. Per-
sons with mental impairments seeking to establish a disability 
based on a substantial limitation in interacting with others face 
a particularly difficult battle. The unpredictability surrounding 
this issue disadvantages employers and employees alike. EEOC 
regulations establishing diagnostic criteria necessary to dem-
onstrate a substantial limitation in interacting with others 
would provide needed clarity to this contentious and confusing 
area of the law. 
 
 191. See generally Rothstein et al., supra note 4. Rothstein and colleagues 
call for a broad regulatory scheme in which Congress authorizes the EEOC to 
publish medical criteria for determining when common physical and mental 
impairments are severe enough to constitute a disability under the ADA. See 
id. at 244. For example, the authors propose that persons with bipolar I disor-
der should qualify as disabled if they (1) are receiving ongoing treatment for a 
confirmed diagnosis of bipolar I disorder; or (2) have a history of hospitaliza-
tion for bipolar I disorder. See id. at 285. Persons with epilepsy should qualify 
as disabled if they (1) have had “one generalized tonic-clonic seizure”; or (2) 
have “been on [antiseizure medication] for at least one year.” Id. at 290. 
 192. For example, the notion that a person suffering from major depressive 
disorder should just “snap out of it” implies that the person, not the mental 
impairment, is causing any limitations in functioning. 
 193. Unlike with hearing and vision, there are no “objective” tests that in-
dicate the degree to which a person’s mental impairment affects his or her 
ability to interact with others. 
